

States' capacity in post-communist countries.

A (partial) comparison of 6 countries

By

Ole Nørgaard
Dept. of Political Science
University of Aarhus
and

Sally N. Cummings
Dept. of Politics,
University of Edinburgh

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'The particularity of any one region's cultural, historical or institutional matrix – if it is relevant to understanding the outcome of regime change – should emerge from systematic comparison, rather than as an excuse for not applying it.'

Schmitter with Karl (1994, p. 178)

The shift towards more state-oriented policies that occurred in the major financial institutions from the mid-1990s (The World Bank 1997) illustrated the fallacy of neo-liberalism as a suitable general transition policy. The social costs incurred by the strategy proved its political infeasibility and the fundamentals of neo-classical economic and public choice theories were challenged, when identical policies and institutions produced widely different outcomes. These dilemmas in turn produced the innovative perspectives on the role of the state that had been developed by historians, sociologists, development economists and international organizations (UNDP, 2001; World Bank, 1997) since the mid-1990s. Different perspectives accompanied this renewed focus on the state in post-communist countries. A first perspective deals with the ability of state institutions to respond to and integrate political demands, mediate conflicts and maintain popular legitimacy while maintaining their autonomy and capacity to govern (Leftwich, 1995, 2000; Weiss, 1998; Evans, 1995; Evans et al., 1979; Krasner, 1984; Skocpol, 1979). Another focuses on the declining ability of the state to provide basic services for its citizens because of financial constraints and inefficient tax collection (Schleifer & Vishny 1999; Schleifer and Treisman 2000; Solnik 1998) while a third examines the capacity of incumbent state institutions and officials to adapt to the changed technical and administrative demands generated by the systemic transformation (Hesse, 1993; König, 1992; Ágh, 1997; Nunberg, 1999, 2000; UNDP, 1997; Horváth 2000; Galligan & Smilov, 1999.)

The present paper continues this work on the role of the state in political and economic transformation focusing in particular on the first perspective: how state-society relations can influence the ability of states to pursue broader developmental goals.¹ A perspective that on the output dimension is similar to what is often termed good governance, defined as 'the process through which societies take and implement decisions on the allocation of public resources to address societal needs' (UNDP, 2001: 1) resumes the discourse that was initiated 1970s, when

¹ It is an integral part of the DEMSTAR program (*DEM*ocracy, the *ST*ate and *Ad*ministrative Reforms), dealing with states and state capacities in post-communist and developing countries. A part of this program focuses on core political and administrative institutions (ministries) where we so far have conducted structured interviews with 50-70 centrally placed politicians and executives in six countries and have initiated a new round of interviews in 6 countries. Eventually we intend to cover most of the post-communist countries, excluding Russia which deserves a comparative analysis of its own.

Neorealists argued that the state as the central actor has high autonomy, which contrasted with liberals who saw the state's autonomy constrained by interdependence and non-state actors (e.g. Keohane & Nye, 1977; Rosenau, 1980; Gilpin, 1975, 1981; Krasner, 1978; Waltz, 1979). Scholars in the disciplines of sociology and comparative political economy in the 1980s echoed this state debate. Theda Skocpol's seminal *States and Social Revolutions* (1979) was followed by the co-edited *Bringing the State Back In* (Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, 1985). Here the state is viewed as an autonomous actor over domestic society and largely a reactor to international forces. Within the economy, 'statists' argued that the key to successful economic performance was based on strong 'developmental' states with high autonomy and bureaucratic 'proactivism', with the East Asian economies used as case studies (Amsden, 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade, 1990). In recent years there has been what Hobson (2000) has usefully termed a 'second state debate'. These theorists propose an alternative theory of state autonomy, namely one where state power derives from the extent to which states are embedded in society (e.g. Mann, 1993; Evans, 1995; Weiss & Hobson, 1995; Weiss, 1998). State-society relations are regarded here not as zero- but positive sum, usefully conceptualised by the notion of "mutual embeddedness". Through broadly based interactions with civil society the state will, allegedly, enhance its capacities to design and implement feasible and viable developmental policies. The same line of argument about state-society relation guides Stark and Bruzst's (1998) book on post-communist development in Central Europe.

Building on this tradition the paper wants to do two things. First, it is our ambition further to develop the conceptual framework that helps us to put more precise questions when we ask about the capacities of states to foster development, in particular by distinguishing between ideational, operational and effective capacity. Second, we attempt to apply this framework to the analyses of state capacities in 6 post-communist states exploring and comparing surveys of centrally placed government elites.²

1. Conceptual and theoretical framework

Our starting point for this analysis is that states are important vehicles for social-economic change in post-communist reconstructions, thus continuing the statist tradition, as summarized in the introduction. Starting from this discourse we answer questions about states' relative capacities to solve developmental problems (in less modernized countries) and adaptive tasks (in distorted, post-communist countries), in short to master good governance. In answering these questions we


² See appendix 1 for a short description of the surveys.

differentiate between three analytical levels and types of capacities: ideational, operational and effective capacity.

Ideational capacity

First order capacity we call **Ideational capacity**. It relates to the relationship between the official ideology as reflected in constitutional documents and authoritative statements by state leaders, the understanding by state officials (high ranking) about what they perceive to be the ‘good’ state, and what the same group perceive to be the real situation in and around the state apparatus. Visualized these triangular relationships related to ideational capacity looks like this:

Fig. 1. Dimensions of state capacity



If relationship 1 is positive, the state has legitimacy and if negative it has a lack of legitimacy with ensuing low ideational capacity. If relationship 2 is negative the state also has low legitimacy but we will also experience low cognitive consistency³ at the individual level, when civil servants sense a conflict between what they are told they should be doing and what they experience in their every day life. Such a situation will produce an unstable situation where civil servants will attempt to

³ We here use the term ‘cognitive consistence’ as a positive statement defined as the antithesis to cognitive dissonance, referred to in the psychological literature as ‘the feeling of discomfort that occur when Bert, for example, holds two or more inconsistent cognitions and/or when Beet’s acts deviate from his stated beliefs, especially when Bert’s action is discrepant from his customary, typically positive self-conception (Monroe, 2001:500).

change either reality or to question the state ideology. Also in this case we will experience low ideational capacity. If relationship 3 is negative it indicates low cognitive consistency – a gap between how the civil servants believe the state should act – and what it actually does – and hence an unstable situation where civil servants may be expected to change behaviour rather than beliefs. Hence low ideational capacity has – based on the three relationships – two operational forms: degree of cognitive consistency (at the individual level) and state institutions’ degree of legitimacy (at the macro level). In both cases there exists a dissonance between official or private ideology – and the reality in which the official finds himself.

Our central argument is thus that agency and structure provide incomplete explanations for state capacity. They must be supplemented by ideas, understood here in their widest sense of perceptual, discursive, attitudinal and ideational factors. This partly places our analysis in the ideational institutional school (see, for example, Hall, 1989; Blyth, 2000; Hay, 2001, 2002; Craib, 1998; Hay, 2001) Mark Blyth (2001) uses the Swedish case to argue persuasively that ideas are an important factor of institutional change, complementing rational choice based (material interests) explanations. In his account ideas influence institutional change in three ways: as institutional blueprints during periods of uncertainty (which certainly applies to our cases), as also emphasized by Hay (2002: 215), as weapons in distributional struggles (is also valid in our cases), and as cognitive locks (which can only be a hypothesis), replicating classical historical institutional arguments. Blyth further infers that ‘more hierarchic state structures that concentrate decision-making power essentially institutionalize ideas very quickly, and because of this such states are more likely to exhibit cognitive locking’, (24), an observation that makes his arguments especially valid for the post-totalitarian cases we are dealing with in this paper.

The ideational dimension of state capacity, then, resides both in the nature of these actors’ perceptions and in their ability to adapt them to changed circumstances. This approach incorporates psychological work on the need for consistency and self-esteem and linguistic and psychoanalytical literature regarding categorization. This literature is aptly summarized by Monroe, who claims that psychological studies on self-esteem and the need for consistent behaviour and linguistic and psycho-analytical work suggest that people do categorize and that such categorization is a universal of human nature. Basically it is identity that makes the constraints of moral choices – and that this identity is formed by categorization which in turn serves three basic adaptive functions: managerial functions informs of our relationship to the physical and social world and help us organize our behaviour for the future. The emotional function of the self helps us determine our expressive

responses; the organizational function helps us create schemas, the mental structures around which we organize our knowledge (2001: 501).

The identities (and categories) of states and state officials in the post-communist world at the personal and systemic levels are formed on the basis of policy style: the way the political and administrative institutions deal with civil society and organized interests (Pereira, Maravall & Przeworski, 1993:113 ff). Following for example Pereira and Przeworski we may here distinguish between a range of modes (or styles) in which the state interacts with civil society, ranging from one way commands (decreeism), through parliamentary autocracy ('mandatism), inclusion of organized interests (corporatism) and concertation (inclusion and consultation at all levels).

Decretism has in the region first of all been represented by its non-democratic variants: totalitarian and authoritarian states. Institutions were here designed to promote ideologically defined policy goals and civil society institutions conceived of as transmission belts rather than political actors. In that respect public administration was what has been termed 'a policy implementation machine' (UNDP, 2001: 2). At the individual level this traditional function implies that the public servant first of all channelled policies to the people – and not vice versa. We may thus hypothesize that civil servants in post-communist regimes are trapped in his traditional ways of dealing with society and that it probably will be easier for him to adapt to changing ideologies than to mode of behaviour in relation to society. We may therefore hypothesise officials in post-communist regimes to maintain their traditional managerial habits of one-way communication, commands and controls in the relationship to organizations in society (Gozman & Etkind, 1992). Still, many communist systems had evolved towards a system where: 'the more bureaucrats attempted to take into account an ever-expanding set of particular interests, the less the state was capable of policy concertation. In the absence of mediating institutions providing mechanisms of accountability, such taking into account meant that the state was taken captive by policy particularism' (Stark & Bruzst, 1998: 191). Hence, in many cases state officials came out of communism as captives of particular interests, rather than ideal type totalitarian bureaucrats. In these cases the official would either have been corrupted or pinched between official ideologies, his own beliefs – and how everyday life forced him to behave. In these cases he would be particularly exposed to particularism and illicit practices that would be manageable only by new mechanisms of concertation and control.

In its democratic variant, decretism has often been associated with the liberal state. Here state-society interaction is conceptualized though the interest groups trying to convey their demands to the insulated institutions of the state, while decisions are under full control of the state that

implements its decision through an ideal type Weberian democracy. During the early phase of transition the majority of local political actors in post-communist countries wanted to drastically limit the role of the state and state institutions in the transformation process, as reported for the Baltic States in Steen's early survey of elites (Steen, 1994). In reaction to the predominant role of the state and state institutions and enterprises in the incumbent system, the realization that the administrative apparatus was unable to perform under the new circumstances and the prospects for personal profits from liberalization and privatization made local reformers easy targets for neo-liberal policy advisors. In a more positive vein, the expectation was that the market would generate not only efficient allocation of resources and carve out an international economic position based on comparative advantages, but also the structural preconditions for a liberal, pluralist democracy. In this understanding of what drives social and political change, there was little room for state intervention. The state was to provide the legal and institutional framework and leave the rest to the political and economic market. State failure was the problem of primary concern in the collapsed system, and a reduced (minimal) state a precondition for future success. In an awkward irony of history the expectation was that the market could succeed where Soviet Marxism had so dramatically failed: to foster the withering away of the state. We may here assume that whereas it may be conceptually difficult for officials of the previous system to cognitively accept their new managerial role as an insulated elite, the major problem will lie in their technical and administrative ability to handle the new tasks in a radically change political and economic environment.

The corporatist policy style implies that selected structures of society are given independent tasks in design and implementation of policies.⁴ This is the 'embedded state' as described earlier. In a democratic (or democratizing) a corporatist system may, however, have different political meanings. First, it may be a developmental state if it manages to institutionalize representation of societal interests in policy design and implementation but not allow specific interests to dominate the policy process. 'Embeddedness' may, however, also be negative and reflect the capture of the state and government by particularistic interests (elites or societal groups) (Schleifer & Vishny, 1999). There may, however, also be instances where it is statist elites that usurp institutions (and

⁴ Leftwich has offered a more comprehensive definition of the development state as a relatively autonomous state apparatus that incorporates a developmental elite (often around a charismatic personality), is based on a competent and insulated bureaucracy in a society with a weak and subordinated civil society and the capacity to manage effectively local and foreign economic interests applying a varying balance of repression, legitimacy and performance, which appears to succeed by offering a trade-off between such repression as may exist and the delivery of regular improvements in material circumstances (Leftwich, 2000: 154-9).

assets) in civil society for their own benefit. In this case we may follow Martha Brill Olcott (2002) and talk about a predatory state.

We also argue that governmental integration or embeddedness ('international embeddedness') into the international system offers a parallel range of prospects and dangers.⁵ On the one hand, may 'international embeddedness' provide the informational, political and financial resources, which are necessary for the government to perform adequately under the new conditions? On the other hand does international integration or embeddedness offer a risk of international 'clientistic capture' or 'elite capture' (World Bank, 1997, p.80ff), if the domestic policy process becomes subjugated to the agendas of international organizations or foreign powers not reflecting local concerns.

Cognitive acceptance and implementation of the correlates of the corporatist developmental state may be the most difficult for a previous bureaucrat of a totalitarian state when redefining his managerial and organizational functions. The positive dialogue with and delegation of authority to institutions and organizations outside the state's institutional hierarchy will be the very antithesis to his previous way of dealing with society – or rather to the way they had been expected to deal with society. Or he will enter the new system already aligned with the particular interest that was part of his environment under the old system. Because of these ambivalent legacies the individual in developmental post-communist states may be more exposed to corruption and illegal dealings.

Finally, we may define concertation as the policy style epitomizing the utopian democracy, where popular involvement, participation and co-determination is institutionalized and accepted at all levels of government.

Below we will distinguish between four types of state identities that we will apply in the following analyses. First, we will deal with a totalitarian state identity, where decretism is legitimized by non-democratic means (popular consent), but rather implicitly or explicitly to higher principles (ideology, nationalism etc.). Second we deal with a liberal-state identity, which will be democratically legitimized, but where state institutions (apart from elections) should not collaborate with institutions or organizations in civil society. Third, we talk about a developmental identity to the extent that states are prepared to involve organized interests in policy-making and

⁵ We have previously made an attempt to estimate 'international embeddedness' in alternative modes by construction of an International Integration Index (Triple I), measuring the extent to which newly independent states manage to integrate into the international system. See chapter 1 in Ole Nørgaard & Lars Johannsen (1999), *The Baltic States after independence*, 2nd Edition. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

implementation, without losing control of the overall agenda. If the state is captured by major interests in society or if interests in the state capture assets in society for its own benefit we talk about the captured state or the predator state respectively. Fourth, we will talk about a *popular state*, to the extent that inclusion of the broad populace (and not only organized interests) is reflected in the states and the individual officials identities. We do of course not argue that civil servants in post-communist countries would use (or know) the terminology we apply to the three categories (totalitarian, liberal and developmental). But we do argue that the three categories seen as ideal types capture the major modes of interactions between state and society as epitomized in official state identities and the self-categorization of officials. It is in turn these identities that will inform his formation of managerial, emotional and organizational responses to reality. If Bert's or Vladimir's (The bureaucrats') action is discrepant from his customary, typically positive self-conception his discomfort will make him change behavior at the moment that the factors that induced him to act in conflict with his identities disappear.

Operational capacity

Second order or **operational capacities** refers to the internal resources of the state to handle the political, technical and implementation tasks when addressing address the societal needs' in a concrete society. These capacities are contingent in the sense that they can only be considered (ideally measured) in the context of the ideational state types, as described in the previous section. *Political capacity* is what makes it possible to design and implement policies that meet the genuine concerns of society (good governance in a given context) without becoming a captured or a predator state. *Technical capacity* (efficiency) is about the ability of the state administration by means of its own resources or through institutionalized relations to extra-governmental bodies (think-tanks, universities NGO's etc.) to design coherent, viable and feasible policies. *Administrative capacity* (*efficiency*) measures the ability to implement the policies that have been chosen. An administratively effective (and efficient) state will establish institutions with the resources and competences to design and implement a chosen policy and the ability to remain an autonomous actor vis-à-vis pressures from specific groups and interest groups.

Effective capacity

Third order capacity is what we will term **effective capacity**, that is, the eventual outcome of state actions as consequence of the appropriateness of the identified (ideational) state type in the concrete country context and its operational resources. An *effective* and efficient government (it has a high

capacity) is one that ‘address(es) [societal needs] timely and with a minimum use of available resources’ (UNDP, 2001: 1). In this understanding an effective government will include economic as well as social and political objectives in its policies. We may thus start by placing a state into one of the ideational categories. Is the state ideationally predominantly (in its relation to society) totalitarian, liberal, developmental or popular? And what is the ideational capacity in terms of state legitimacy (macro level) and the cognitive consistency of the individual official (micro level)? Having performed this categorization we may then assess the operational qualities and eventually its effective capacity to solve developmental and adaptive tasks of the state in a given country context. An initial analytical question is then if the type of state we have identified in a given country context ‘fits’ the developmental tasks ahead (Risse, Cowles & Caporaso, 2001). In this process countries obviously will have different distances to travel dependent on the initial institutional features and the character of the institutions being imposed. The imposed models will also be more or less ‘fitted’ to solve the problems in the recipient country.

Following this logic we may then start by asking about the ‘goodness of fit’ of the four state types to solve the developmental (or adaptive) problems of a concrete country: to which extent totalitarian, liberal, developmental or popular states (of aspects thereof) fare best in concrete country settings. The answer we give, however, can only be decided analytically, taking into account the concrete country context, the policy tasks ahead and the ideational and operational capacities of the state. A totalitarian or authoritarian state may, in the hindsight of history, have proven to have been the most effective agency to manage reactionary forces, mobilize the population around common goals and generate investment resources needed for modernization.⁶ Or if a state’s political capabilities (the links to society) are few (for one reason or another) and if technical and administrative capacities are in short supply, a limited liberal state will obviously work better than a developmental state that stretches its tasks beyond capabilities. The same argument may apply to societies dominated by strong particularistic interest groups (for example ethnic) or with legacies that expose parts of the state administration to sectoral capture, as was the case in a number of post-communist countries. In these cases a limited and autonomous state that matches tasks to capabilities and escapes capture will obviously fare better.⁷ In contrast, if the problem is that groups within the state exploit society for their benefit, a popular democracy may

⁶ Whether the human cost associated with the totalitarian state can be morally defended is a separate issue we do not deal with in this context.

⁷ Whether we can infer a historical succession of state types, where totalitarian are best in early stages of development – and liberal and developmental states at later stages is a separate question we will not delve into in this paper.

be the only way to limit the power and privileges of the groups aligned with the predator state. From these arguments follows that it is pointless to assess the operational, political, technical or administrative capacities of a state independently from its historical and institutional context.

Hence the analytical scheme would look somewhat like this:

Box 1. Types of capacities – and levels of analyses.

Designation	Analytical level	Analytical Categories	Type of Capacity	Effects
1 st order capacity	Classificatory	Totalitarian Liberal Developmental (captured, predator)	Ideational	legitimacy/illegitimacy (state level) Cognitive consistency (individual level)
2 nd order capacity	Evaluative	Political Technical Administrative	Internal resources, contingent	Ability to design and implement appropriate policies in given context
3 rd order capacity	Analytical	Traditional indices of socio-economic development	Goodness of fit	Socioeconomic and political development

Below we will make a preliminary attempt to apply (part of) this analytical scheme to a comparison of six post-communist countries representing three regions and what we would expect also to be three different identities:

1. Hungary, as a representative of a Central Europe we would expect to have moved the farthest away from the legacy of the totalitarian state;
2. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as a representative of two CIS countries, that – although with different reforms trajectories - closer related to past structures and mentalities;
3. The three Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania together representing something in between 1 and 2 as previous integral parts of the former Soviet Union but also with distinct national if not regional identities.

First we summarize the identities of centrally placed state officials and the way they perceive state institutions to work. Thus we will not in this context address the issue of state identities, partly to limit the size of the paper, partly because many of the states do not yet have a clear concept about the role they see for themselves. Only for the Central European countries (including the Baltic States) does EU membership make the framework for a minimum definition of that role. Second, we compare the operative capacities of the six states focusing in particular on the ability to interact

with institutions, and organizations in society without compromising autonomy and polity coherence. (political capacity), In the conclusion we make a first attempt to assess the goodness of fit between ideational and operational capacities and the complex problems that stand ahead of each country.

2. Ideational capacity

In figure 1 we identified three dimensions of ideational capacity, developed from the relationships in the triad of state identity and the individual officials identity and perceptions of the state's working. In the present section we explore the relation between the individual official's subjective identity and his perceptions of the real world in his everyday work. Because we address only one of three relations we can of course here only provide a partial answer to the issue of ideational capacity.

2.1 Bureaucrats' identities

A first observation is that the data does not lend support to our expectation that high ranking officials still carry the legacy of the totalitarian bureaucrat who sees his primary task only as that of a technical implementor of government policies, an identity that was characterized by some respondents when asked if officials interacted with civil society: "There was no motivation for that. Ministerial officials have an opinion that their knowledge is greater", "It makes public officers life more complicated, Public officers self defence function works: if there are some relations it means the bigger number of the alternatives, which means that public officer has to defend his project (Latvia). Still the majority see themselves as developmental bureaucrats who want to the public engaged in participatory structures.

Table 1 about here

Still it can be seen that the less reformed countries and those with the heaviest legacy (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) also have a larger share of officials who prefer to keep the public at arm's length. In a Baltic/Central European context it is also remarkable that Lithuanian officials seem more reluctant toward participatory democracy than other countries in the region.

However, what the respondents mean by social inclusion in policy making becomes clearer when we look at Table 2, which in a more narrow sense asks about the inclusion of organized interests in decision-making.

Table 2 about here

The high percentage of confirmative answers is exemplified by statements like: “Mutual change of information is always useful, result will be effective legislation” (Estonia). “Interest groups are competent in their field, officials often does not” (Estonia). “I always listened to various opinions, yet the decision was taken by the Minister and frequently it differed from those opinions” (Latvia). “When discussing a democratic decision, everybody should partake, but those who are empowered to do so shall take the decision itself”; “It is important to meet and hear the business and private sector as well” (Hungary). “в результате сопоставления различных точек зрения на проблему вытекает наиболее реальная государственная политика” (Kazakhstan), “При разработке законопроекта министерства не может охватить все мнение, поэтому необходимо учитывать мнение всех сторон для нахождения компромисса во благо общества” (Kyrgyzstan). Remarkable here is only the perception of Lithuanian officials. In contrast to their more reluctant attitude to the active inclusion of the public in policy making (the popular state) they are almost unanimous in the approval of organized interest. This picture probably reflects the continuation of deep-rooted relationships between ministries and large industrial and economic groupings.

The pattern is finally replicated in the attitude to lobbying, as a legitimate part of the policy process, where the approval rate (for lobbyism as an information mechanism) is lower in Central Asia (and Hungary). The suspicious attitude to lobbyism was further boosted when we asked about the attitude to lobbyism as a way of building support. Here the negative attitude to lobbyism reaches out to countries where the risk of state capture seems highest.

Table 3 about here

These attitudes also find ample reflection in the open comments: “Contacts are important in terms of information but ministry has the duty to estimate them critically and to maintain objectivity” (Estonia); “It is worth listening to all sides always, but the decision is still made by myself.” (Latvia); “Lobbying is positive because you get the support from the industrial branches” (Latvia); “In nowadays Lithuania, lobbyism makes up 30 per cent, while corruption makes up 70 per cent”, “Lobbyism in the world is open. Here, it is closed, unclear and not transparent. Everybody acts as if

they make efforts for the common good of Lithuania, but really their lobbyism resembles corruption.” (Lithuania); “Lobbying is natural – it does not equal corruption. Everyone tries to represent their interests, but the responsibility is of those who make the decision” (Hungary); “Лобби – это положительное в целом явление, если оно осуществляется без учета интересов узкого круга получателей результатов политического процесса”, “– Отрицательное воздействие – это вовлечение иностранной силы в различные процессы” (Kasakhstan); – ”Парламент очень часто лоббирует интересы отдельных крупных бизнесменов. Они преследуют свои интересы, а не государства. А. Акаев – лоббировал интересы народа, представленные на рассмотрение в парламент предложение о размещении военных баз на территории Кыргызской Республики. Это было в интересах государства.” (Kyrgyzstan).

The ‘conveyor belt’ approach to organization as a legacy of the old system is further sustained when the officials are asked about the role of organized interests in implementation. The highest score is here reached in the Central Asian Countries and in Lithuania, while the more modernized countries have a more realistic approach to the kind of influence that may arise from implementation in a less regulated environment.

Table 4 around here

“Rural development is not possible without massive involvement of agrarian companies, which should solve those issues. Lithuania is quite behindhand with this matter. Laws do not contain references to financial resources and delegating of tasks (dissimilarly from Denmark)” (Lithuania); “It would be best to give everything into the hands of private entrepreneurs, but it would be to difficult to prepare and control” (Hungary); “Это необходимо всегда. Например, в Иссык-Кульской области мы взаимодействуем с аксакалами, гражданским союзом (НПО) и консультируемся с учеными, политическими деятелями” (Kyrgyzstan).

Still another issue relates to the technical capacity of the administrations. Who do officials turn to when they need advice? The survey here demonstrates that in all countries academics are the major source of external advice. A trend that may reflect a situation where inadequately staffed and trained administrations contract out’ most policy development work to experts and itself deals mainly with ‘translating’ developed concepts into draft legislation (UNDP, 2001).

Table 5 around here

There are, however, also large differences between the countries, reflecting the political environment in which the officials find themselves. NGO specialists can of course only be active in countries where a viable NGO sector exists, and party experts are only important in countries with effective party systems. It is only surprising to find that party experts play a very minor role in Lithuania, where the common wisdom is that the party system is very consolidated.

A final way to approach the identity of officials is to ask them about how they see their own role in the future, in this context operationalized as to which other country they expect that they own will compare with in ten years time.

Table 6 around here

First, the responses demonstrate a clear regional pattern, where a majority of officials in the European countries all identify their future role with Western democracies and a majority (significantly largest in Lithuania) foresee that they will maintain a Central European identity. Second, the data also demonstrates the ambiguous identities of officials in the two central Asian States. Identities are here fragmented between post-Soviet, Central and Eastern Europe, NIC and West-European (especially in Kyrgyzstan) identities.

If we summarize the evidence in tables 1 through 6 a key observation is that our hypothesis about the endurance of the totalitarian bureaucrat does not hold. The majority of the officials we interviewed in all six countries hold the identity of what we have termed a developmental bureaucrat, who thinks that participation of the organized interests (and in the abstract also the broad public) in decision-making and implementation will improve policies. Within this overall observation, however, there are variations that in general reflect our expectations about the imprints of the past and of reform policies since independence: popular participation is less popular in the less reformed countries of central Asia – and in Lithuania, who – together with Hungary – has the highest endorsement rate of organized interests. The latter pattern probably reflects the endurance of state-industry links from the communist system. This would also explain the reluctant attitude to lobbying as a way to obtain political support, because lobbying is often the strategy of those newly formed interests (business and other) who did not have a stake in the previous corporate system. The exception is here Estonia (and to a lesser extent Hungary) indicating that some officials in these countries are leaning toward an identity of the liberal state's insulated official.

2.2 State officials' perception of reality

One thing is how a state's officials want relations to civil society be. It is quite another thing how they perceive that they really are. If identities and perceptions match we may talk about cognitive consistency. If not, cognitive dissonance will make the official act in ways that are contrary to what he believes is the best way to make sound policies. What is the cognitive congruence of the officials in the six post-totalitarian states we deal with in this paper?

Overall, there is seemingly a relatively high consistency between identities and the perceived reality of our respondents. The developmental identities that were reflected in the previous sections are repeated in answers to questions about how relations between ministries and society actually are, as a comparison between tables 2 and 7 will demonstrate.

Table 7 about here

Also the open comments illustrate the positive (but only gradually consolidating) interaction with organized interests: "There were a lot of co-work with NGO-s and special commission was formed" (Estonia); Close working relationship just started to be established (Latvia); "There were almost no known organizations: trade unions were only creating, as well as employer organizations", "Confederation of Industrialists, two business associations, - if problems with excise on beer or oil products occurred, we usually discussed with interested organizations from that field" (Lithuania); "По вопросам развития торговли и промышленности министерство образует совместные комиссии, экспертные и рабочие группы с привлечением в них специалистов предприятий, НПО и др" (Kyrgyzstan).

However, there are a few deviations from this general statement. First, in Estonia the actual participation of organizations in decision making is significantly lower than the more participatory officials deem optimal, reflecting the gradual emergence of an organizational sector in a society where the previous linkages had been broken by a radical reforms strategy: "Organizations were not formed at those days", was statement repeated a number of times.

Second, and in contrast, in Central Asia participation by organized interests is higher than the respondents wanted. Their experience seems to tell that less than actual participation of organized interests would improve policies. This observation leads to the next section, in which we deal with operational capacity. Third, in all countries but Hungary, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan, participation of

organized interests is described more as an ad hoc instrument (used by government) than a permanent institutional feature.

Table 8 about here

An identical picture is reflected in Table 9 (where we lack data for the Baltic States), which illustrates the predominance of institutionalized participation in Hungary and Kyrgyzstan while inclusion is on a more ad hoc basis in Kazakhstan.

Table 9 about here

Table 10 shows the results of a survey among heads of parliamentary committees about the preferred ways that influence interests groups should act (again excluding the Baltic States). The table further illustrates the importance assigned by interest groups to ministries as a channels of influence. However, it also illustrate the importance of parties in the consolidated party system of Hungary and the continuing importance of personal connections, in particular in Kyrgyzstan.

Table 10 about here

Finally, we may compare their anticipated (awaited) future identity (Table 6) with how they actually compare their country in its present state with other systems or regions (Table 11). These comparative identities are shown in table 6, indicating that the two Baltic states for which we have data still have a central European identity, that Hungary is evenly split between a Central European and a Western identity, and that officials in Central Asia predominantly see themselves as part of the post-Soviet CIS region.

Table 11 about here.

In this picture it is Estonia and Hungary who have the furthest to go from where they see themselves (as Central Europeans) to where they want to be (West Europeans), while Lithuania still remains more anchored in a Central European identity. In Central Asia it is difficult to say anything other than noting that many of our respondents want to escape their present identification with the CIS countries to become something else.

2.3 Preliminary conclusions on ideational capacity

The purpose of this section was to make a first attempt to assess and compare what we called ideational capacity described as the relation between the individual identities of civil servants and how they perceive their everyday administrative environment. In the present context we only address one of these three dimensions: the relationship between the subjective identities and the perceptions of the administrative reality.

The first task was here to establish the subjective identities of top ranking officials in six post-communist countries. Our initial expectation was that they would still be tainted by the mentalities and ways of doing things of the former system in relations to civil society, if not in substance then in the extent to which they would prefer to include and involve broader society in decision making (policy style). This expectation was not met. In all countries a majority of officials would prefer to involve the broad public as well as organized interests as ‘the process through which societies take and implement decisions on the allocation of public resources to address societal needs’, as we in a previous section quoted a UNDP definition of good governance. Further, to a very large extent these identities corresponded to how they described the way their administrations worked, although with some important exceptions. First, in Estonia the developmental identity of the officials was in stark contrast to a very limited inclusion of organized interests in civil society. From this partial perspective, Estonian core institutions have a weak ideational identity where the ideas of officials clash with everyday practices. Second, in Central Asia we have the opposite picture: the role organized interests play in policy-making is greater than is deemed positive. These negative responses indicate that some of our respondents realize the potentially negative function of societal participation (state capture, corruption or, alternatively, the existence of a predator state bent on protecting its privileges), which we address in the next section. Also in this restricted sense we may talk about reduced ideational capacity. Finally, while interest organizations had close and mostly institutionalized relations with the ministries in Lithuania, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan, their role was more restricted and regulated by the ministries in Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan. Hence, it is only in the first group that involvement of interest groups is habitual and institutionalized, while the state in the second group is relatively insulated and only occasionally includes external actors in decision making. In accordance with the initial classification we may thus hypothesize that Lithuania, Hungary and Kyrgyzstan are real developmental states with a potentially high ideational capacity because the identities of officials correspond to how relations to civil society really are. Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan in their

practices lean more towards the insulated liberal state, which presents a potential conflict with the identities of the officials and hence lower their ideational capacity on this particular dimension. We return to a further interpretation of this tendency towards insulation in the conclusion.

3. Operational (political) capacity

In section 1 we defined operational capacity as the internal resources of the state designated to handle the political, technical and implementation tasks when addressing ‘the societal needs’ in a concrete society. In this context we look into only one aspect: the operational political capacity which may then be defined as the ability of the state to make and implement decisions without concession to special groups but taking into account only the general societal needs of the country. In this perspective analyses of a state’s operational political capacity will of course entail personal, structural, institutional and financial aspects of the state. We may, however, also approach the question from the opposite angle, inferring that if a state has political capacity it will not permit privileged treatment of individuals or organizations, and employees in state institutions will be prone to granting such privileges for personal gain.

From this perspective, we asked a number of questions about corruption and regulatory effectiveness in the 6 countries to obtain an indirect measure of the states’ operative political capacity. First we asked the officials how they assess the independence of their colleagues from the special interests they deal with in their everyday work.

Table 12 about here

As depicted in table 12, does a surprisingly high rate of our respondents expect their colleagues to be disposed to misusing their position?⁸ Only in Estonia and Hungary does a majority reject the claim that their colleagues are corrupt. When asked about the level at which corruption was most common (this question was also asked in Kazakhstan) in the high corruption countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan), misuse is reported to be concentrated at the intermediate administrative level, while Kazakhstani officials see misuse concentrated at the highest government levels.

⁸ For political reasons it was not possible to ask this question in Kazakhstan. However, other sources indicate that the level of corruption is not less in Kazakhstan. See data from World Bank Institute at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz/worldmap.asp#map>

Table 13 about here

That the states also have very weak enforcement powers is shown in Table 14, where officials in all countries agree that it is possible for major actors to escape regulatory measures. A few interesting observations stand out. First, factor analyses of the Estonian and Hungarian responses show that we are here dealing with only one dimension, probably weakness of the regulatory system. It seems fair to conclude that this observation also applies to Latvia and Lithuania where we only have summary observations that do not differentiate between different actors. In the case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the picture is more complex, and not only the weakness of the regulatory system but also the different positions of strong actors play a role. These different causes of regulatory escape was illustrated in remarks by our respondents: “Regulatory measures are escaped in all levels, also from Consumer Protection Act and Free Competition Act” (Estonia); – “Weak points of laws are being used, with the help from lawyers and large amounts of money.” (Lithuania); “. The examples are those things which give chance for expection (the little gates). The political relationship is important” (Hungary); “Предприниматели постоянно нарушают законодательство”; ”Много указов, законов о лицензировании о разрешении, обеспечивать прозрачность, тем не менее, местные органы отдельных предприятий нарушают законодательство, усиливают свою власть, источник дохода. Частные предприятия – скрытое наличие контрабанды” (Kyrgyzstan).

Table 14 about here

We also asked about perceived causes of corruption (tables 15 and 16). Whereas too low salaries and low moral of civil servants (and the obvious trade-offs between the two) came out on top in all countries, the much celebrated legacies of the Soviet system were only referred to as an important factor in less reformed Kazakhstan. Also shortcomings of the legal system are considered an important cause of corruption, as only respondents in Estonia and, with a smaller margin, in Kazakhstan see present laws as sufficient for combating corruption. Few of the interviewees attribute organised crime as a cause of corruption, while the position of regional and clan interests is seen as a major problem in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Finally, we asked how the officials viewed the role of foreign actors in the country (Table 15).

Table 15 about here

The table shows a distinct reverse correlation between the size of the country (in geographical and economic terms) and the popularity of foreign actors, although we also in the countries where positive treatments predominated found both more positive and ambivalent positions. Also the very low popularity of foreign actors in Kazakhstan is notable: “It was not influence; it was more like getting advice” (Estonia); “Western actors have positive influence, Russian actors negative”, “It may be unpleasant to admit but this influence has secured the fact that changes of the social, economic, political system cannot be turned back” (Latvia); “We have been learning everything. During 2 years all the documents for the IMF and other organizations have been prepared with the cooperation of them”, “The goal for all the foreign or international organizations with no exception were wrecking Lithuanian agricultural production as soon as possible. It’s level has decreased several times, during the past several years, and now it is as long back as it was in 1930’ies.” (Lithuania); “- In many cases the positive and negative effects neutralized each other. These things are natural, but they didn’t influence my decisions.” (Hungary); “– практически все иностранные компании приходят для дополнительной прибыли, их не интересуют здоровье, образование, будущее нации, хотя делают «подачки» и этим козыряют”, “Иностранные структуры преследуют свои цели, прикрываясь заботой и поддержкой развивающегося государства” (Kasakhstan); “– Положительный результат, международные организации имеют большой опыт работы в нашей сфере; дают деньги для улучшения образования, в законодательстве, конвенция о правах ребёнка” (Kyrgyzstan).

Summarizing these responses on corruption and regulatory escape in the six countries we may conclude that whereas the previous section showed that the ideational capacity in most countries was relatively high and based on corporate structures that connected the state institutions with civil society, the data from this section suggests that these bonds, rather than a positive interaction, in many cases reflect a negative version of the corporatist potentials of a developmental state. This is the topic of the concluding section.

4. Conclusions: Preliminary hypotheses about Effective Capacity

We started this paper by asking three sets of interrelated questions related to the policy styles and state identities of the six states we deal with: First, do the perceptions of the officials correspond to the reality they live in? (ideational capacity). Second, do the states possess the internal resources needed to realize the identities they have? (operational capacity). Third, does the concrete policy

style and the patterns of societal inclusion of concerned interests in society ‘fit’ the developmental and adaptive needs of the concrete country so that it enters a positive path of economic, social and political development? (effective capacity). A country’s success in meeting its developmental and adaptive objectives, however, can only be analyzed in the interface between a state’s ideational and operational capacity and the specific context within which it operates. Which policy style or state type ‘fits’ the specific context can only be decided empirically. Below we make a preliminary attempt to determine the suitability of the policy styles/state types and their operational capacity to meet the challenges.

We begin by defining the very different starting points characterizing the six countries on two dimensions: The legacy of the previous systems and the demands from the external environment. When combining these two dimensions we obtain the following matrix:

Table 16: Dimensions of Context

Internal context	Post-Soviet Countries	Previous independence
External environment		
EU-candidate conditionality	Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania	Hungary
Diffuse global demands	Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan	

This taxonomy distinguishes between the type and intensity of the external demands on the institutional reforms and the context in which these reforms are to be implemented, at this level seen as the difference between countries that were or were not part of the integrated Soviet system. The first distinction has very much to do with the intensity of the demands set by the European Union to candidate countries that results in very strict ‘adaptational pressures’, defined as ‘a process by which one set of institutions – the European rules, regulations, and collective understandings – interact with another set of institutions – the given domestic structures in the membership states’ (Olsen, 1995b) The three Baltic States and Hungary all belong to this group, while the two Central Asian states only face the much more diffuse demands from international organizations and bilateral partners. This implies that discussions about the ‘institutional fit’ of the first group has very much to do with the extent to which European institutions fit the demands of the internal demands in these countries, while such external constraints do not apply to the Central Asian countries.

Looking first at the EU candidate countries it is significant that among the former Soviet republics (The Baltic States) it is the country (Estonia) that has chosen the most insulated policy (neo-liberal) policy style that has fared most successfully in economic and political terms. Growth rates have been higher than in the other two Baltic States, operational capacity higher and democracy is more consolidated. One explanation is here that the insulated state seems to have been well suited to the initial conditions that characterized many of the post-Soviet republics. The last phase of Soviet power had in many regions witnessed the development of a state corporatist system where the huge enterprises dominated sectoral policy making and were stronger than the corresponding ministries. The insulated state (and neo-liberal economic policies) was here the obvious way to break those links and form the basis of effective democratic governance.⁹ Also in Latvia there were attempts to build development on the same policy style, but the insulated state was here compromised at an early stage when new (and old) business interests consciously were drawn into the political system as constituent and founding partners of the new party system. It was these early bonds that at later stages made Latvia one of the most corrupted countries in the region. A truly insulated state would have been more promising for economic and political development. Both Lithuania and Hungary have experienced a much more gradual development, where previous structures have survived the systemic changes. In Lithuania these close corporate links were maintained during the systemic changes, resulting in low operational capacity with high levels of perceived corruption, while the corporate type of governance seems to have fared better in Hungary, which also has a historically formed tradition for consensual policy making (Agh, 2001). One explanation for this may be the more developed and mature democracy in Hungary working as a check on embedded corporate bonds. Judging from these cases a mature, liberal and pluralist democracy may be a precondition if the corporative development state is to prove effective in post-communist systems.

Turning to our two Central Asian states their external environment leaves more freedom for internal choices, which at the same time are made much more difficult by a difficult legacy of the former system and of much more fractured societies.

Responses by the two republics show significant similarities. Three important differences have emerged, however. On the attitudinal level we have observed a strikingly more negative attitude to foreign influence in Kazakhstan than in Kyrgyzstan. Second, we have also observed that societal participation is more regularized in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan, where participation is

⁹ xx provides a process analyses of how this insulated state came about. See xx 2002.

said to occur more on ad hoc basis, and where more faith is placed in legal than social measures to regulate interaction between the state and society. Third, the more regularized participation in Kyrgyzstan, however, takes the form of personalized channels of influence, expressed and operationalised either through clan or regional interests, where people seem more likely than in Kazakhstan to use personal connections to obtain influence. Bringing the above observations back to our original questions of state-society relations and the four dimensions, our central conclusion from the above preliminary observations is that Kyrgyzstan's state is captured by both domestic and international forces, while Kazakhstan's enjoys domestic and international autonomy.

The reasons for this difference are threefold. First, we acknowledge the role played by extractive industries in shaping the nature of the Kazakhstani state. Kazakhstan's natural wealth meant that already by 1997 the republic had become the primary post-Soviet recipient of per capita foreign investment, and by 2002 had earned the title of a 'market economy'. The Kazakhstani state has to a considerable degree been able to set the terms of international engagement to transnational corporations. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan had become the primary post-Soviet recipient of per capita international aid during the 1990s, and is beholden to the goodwill of the international community for the continuation of this aid. Here we note nevertheless the considerable political and ideational capacity Kyrgyzstan has shown in this endeavour: President Akaev managed with enormous success to market his country as the Switzerland of Central Asia, earning his country the title of 'darling of the donors'. In short, Kazakhstan enjoys considerably greater international state autonomy than Kyrgyzstan.

But experience elsewhere shows that extractive industries do not necessarily strengthen state capacity, and an important intervening variable must explain why the Kazakhstani elite has been able to manage this process. The second reason appears to be Kazakhstan's decision to control political and economic liberalisation, compared to Kyrgyzstan's rapid decision to do both. By controlling political and economic liberalisation, the Kazakhstani state has been able to keep resources in the hands of a minority, and hence preserve some of its autonomy. Kazakhstan came to epitomize what has been called 'capitalist without capitalism' (Eyal, 2000: 50). Or a predatory state in the terminology of this paper. The state's autonomy has been abetted by a considerable streamlining of the state since 1997 under World Bank guidelines. This streamlining occurred in the executive branch as a whole, rather than just within the presidential apparatus alone, and may have imparted greater institutional coherence.

By contrast, Kyrgyzstan's rapid liberalisation empowered external actors – in particular the regions and the international community – to the detriment of the central state. President Akaev began to decentralise political authority soon after his election in 1990. Moreover, from independence until the beginning of 1994 Kyrgyzstan arguably had among the most free and open media in the former Soviet Union. Also political parties and social movements were allowed to develop and Akaev actively included them in the decision-making process. The republic was also the first former Soviet republic after Russia to implement price liberalisation and the first Central Asian republic to introduce its own currency. Both political and economic liberalisation gave momentum to the international community to further this liberalisation process.

Third, and relatedly, this empowerment of non-state actors, and the increased competition between them, has heightened clan and regional cleavages in Kyrgyzstan which have ultimately captured the state. In Kazakhstan by contrast, the mixed policy of controlled reform with de facto decentralisation ensured that key economic interests have been incorporated. Kazakhstan has managed to coopt these non-state identities and interests into its state-building programme. For the moment these motley interests and identities have managed to coexist. Recent authoritarian repressive measures, however, threaten to upset this balance. Moreover, Kazakhstan's sheer size reduced the risk of capture by insular regional and kinship networks such as is the case in Kyrgyzstan.

If this picture then speaks of Kazakhstan's greater political, administrative and technical capacity than Kyrgyzstan's, the same cannot be said of the ideational. Ideational capacity, as explained earlier, relies partly on legitimacy. But public opinion polls in both countries showed in the 1990s that Kazakhstan's public views its government as less legitimate than its Kyrgyz counterpart. 56 per cent of Kyrgyzstani citizens regard their state and social institutions as (partially) transparent, compared to only 35 per cent of Kazakhstanis, and only 29 percent of Kazakhstanis express satisfaction with reform, compared to 42 percent of Kyrgyzstanis. And yet only 31 percent of Kyrgyzstan's respondents – as opposed to 48 percent of Kazakhstan's – have confidence that their 'government has the capacity to deliver what it has promised'.¹⁰ Other findings also show that if Nazarbaev's regime has increased in power over the years, its authority has declined (Cummings, 2001).

Our findings, still at a preliminary stage, suggest three important hypotheses on effective capacity. One, that the link between the ideational and the material, between ideational and

¹⁰ Marketing Research Agency, *Brif*, Almaty, July 1999.

effective capacity, is complex but important. The Kazakhstani elite view itself as developmental but in reality has managed to tightly control the resources to the point where corruption has reached the highest echelons of power. The elite's behaviour does not match its perceived role as a developmental state. We saw the same picture in Estonia where a majority of our respondents preferred to interact with organized interests but the reality was a much more insulated state. Furthermore, its behaviour is viewed as illegitimate by the public. This suggests that there is no immediate link between ideational capacity and the other three capacities. It also suggests that in the long run Kazakhstan and Estonia may run into problems as a result of this dissonance between its ideational and other dimensions of state capacity.

Second, the corporate development state will, in a post-social context, only work if it is underpinned by a functioning democracy. Otherwise the system may either decay into a captured (Latvia) or a predator (Kazakhstan) state, depending on the strength of the state and organized interests.

Third, our initial findings suggest that, in state capacity terms, early political and economic liberalisation is not necessarily advisable in societies with considerable socioeconomic cleavages and low participation. This is because in a cleavaged society the empowerment of external political, economic and social forces has been to the detriment of the centre. Our results suggest that in cleavaged societies statist political and economic political reform has a better chance of preventing social forces from capturing the state.

This is where Weiss and Hobson's (1995) more inclusive view of social forces may come into play. Their findings elsewhere suggest that if state capacity is to be sustainable, post-communist state-builders may need to engage in a second stage of their relations with society, one which incorporates a broader range of social forces.

Appendix 1: About the interviews

The data presented in this paper is the outcome of surveys conducted in 6 different post-communist countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. We are presently engaged in parallel surveys in Poland, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Georgia, Azerbajdzjan, Armenia and Moldova. In all cases the ambition has been to reach a subset of executive officials of high standing placed as high as possible in the administrative hierarchies in core ministries, taking into account the constitutional and administrative structure and what was considered core ministries in the individual country. The surveys were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire supplemented by a number of open questions subsequently reported to us by the interviewers. The questionnaire covers a wide range of issues related to decision making, power structures, technical and administrative capacities. The questionnaires will be accessible at the project homepage www.demstar.dk

In Latvia the survey was conducted in association with Ilze Ostrovska, Riga, and it comprises interviews with 51 former and current ministers in core Latvian ministries. The interviews were made in the beginning of 2000 (Pilot project).

In Lithuania the survey was conducted together with Dalius Norkunas, Vilnius, during the autumn of 2000. This survey comprises interviews with 53 former and current ministers from core ministries.

During the spring of 2001 surveys were carried out in Estonia and Hungary. The Estonian survey was conducted by Saar Poll Ltd., Tallinn, and the sample of respondents is 50 former and current ministers of core ministries. The Hungarian survey has a sample of 35 interviews with ministers from core ministries and 15 interviews with chairmen of core parliamentary committees.

The last two surveys (in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) were conducted between November 2001 and April 2002. In Kazakhstan the survey was conducted by Komkon-2 Eurasia Research Institute, Almaty. This survey comprises altogether 55 centrally placed decision makers in core ministries (30) and core parliamentary committees (25). In Kyrgyzstan the survey was conducted in association with the National Academy of Sciences. The sample of respondents is 17 chairmen of core parliamentary committees and altogether 38 centrally placed decision makers in core ministries (15), the Prime Minister's office (15) and the Presidential Administration (8).

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Tables

Table 1. Responses to question 45: ‘What role should the public primarily play in politics and government?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan*
The public should become actively engaged in parties, associations, local government, etc. in order to gain greater influence on politics.	74.0	75.5	67.9	72.7	57.1	63.9
The public should take an interest in politics and communicate their views to the representatives.	20.0	18.4	17.0	6.1	25.0	30.6
The public should elect representatives and let them run the country	6.0	6.1	15.1	21.2	17.9	47.2
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	49	53	33	28	36

* Kyrgyzstan (multiple answer): Percentages responding “agree” to the statements.

Table 2. Responses to question 28: ‘Do you believe that decisions are improved when concerned interests are incorporated or heard in the process of formulation?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Yes, mostly	84.0	81.3	94.2	93.9	73.3	71.1
Yes, sometimes	14.0	16.7	5.8	6.1	26.7	26.3
No, worse	2.0	2.1	-	-	-	2.6
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	48	52	33	30	38

Table 3 . Responses to question 27 about lobbying. Percentages responding “agree” to the following statements. (Multiple answer).

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Lobbying is positive because it provides the information you need to make the right decision	88.0	73.8	88.6	60.0	50.0	66.7
Lobbying is positive because you get support from the concerned groups	70.0	45.5	27.5	60.0	33.3	36.8

Table 4. Responses to question 41: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following proposition?: To ensure compliance in the process of implementation, it is better when organizations, private business or other concerned interests assist in formulating the implementation design.’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Strongly agree/agree	82.0	60.0	81.1	50.0	90.0	86.1
Disagree/strongly disagree	14.0	38.0	16.9	40.7	10.0	11.1
Do not know	4.0	2.0	1.9	9.4	-	2.8
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	50	53	32	30	36

Table 5. Responses to question 4: ‘If you needed external advice, whom would you prefer to rely on, or have you relied on to get the information you need?’
Percentage observations. (Multiple answer).

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Political advisors	26.0	38.0	28.3	24.2	23.3	30.6
Political parties	44.0	24.0	7.5	50.0		11.1
Academic specialists	72.0	72.0	86.8	79.4	60.0	44.4
NGO specialists	44.0	40.0	49.1	48.5	10.0	36.1

Table 6. Responses to question 54: ‘Which other country in the world do you think your country resembles most in ten years?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Russia and other CIS countries	-		-	-	27.3	26.3
A developing country	-		-	-	4.5	15.8
Central and Eastern Europe	8.9		37.8	10.7	22.7	10.5
South East Asia	-		-	-	9.1	10.5
Other newly industrialized countries	-		2.2	-	18.2	10.5
A Western democracy	91.1		60.0	89.3	18.2	26.3
Total (percent)	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	45		45	28	22	19

Table 7. Responses to question 7: ‘In your own ministry, is/was it common practice that ministerial officials have close working relationships with significant organizations (business, NGO, or state) within the field of the ministry?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Yes	44.9	80.0	90.2	81.8	89.7	86.5
No	55.1	20.0	9.8	18.2	10.3	13.5
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	49	50	51	33	29	37

Table 8. Responses to question 26: ‘Do civil servants in your ministry have close working relationships with major interest organizations within the ministry’s resort?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Yes, most of the time	24.0	25.0	53.7	67.6	36.7	58.3
Yes, but only concerning important issues	56.0	39.6	41.5	29.4	50.0	30.6
No	20.0	35.4	4.9	2.9	13.3	11.1
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	48	41	34	30	36

Table 9. Responses to question 28a: ‘In which form is/was the concerned interests incorporated or consulted in the process of formulation?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Institutional forum for discussion and cooperation				89.3	30.0	68.8
Institutional forums on ad hoc basis				7.1	66.7	9.4
Informal forums depending on character of the case				3.6	3.3	21.9
Total (percent)				100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)				28	30	32

Table 10. Responses to question P22: ‘How do interest groups seek influence on lawmaking?’*

	Hungary Parliament	Kazakhstan Parliament	Kyrgyzstan Parliament
They contact the ministries	32.5	30.8	23.2
They contact the committee	8.1	25.3	13.9
They contact the Presidential Administration		17.9	21.9
They use personal channels and connections	23.6	26.0	39.1
They contact party/faction leadership	35.8		
Other	-	-	1.9
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Weighted average: ranked as most important counted as 1, second as 1/2, third as 1/3.

Table 11. Responses to question 54: ‘Which other country in the world do you think your country resembles most? (At present)’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Russia and other CIS countries	-		2.1	-	52.4	46.2
A developing country	-		-	-	14.3	34.6
Central and Eastern Europe	88.9		89.4	50.0	4.8	-
South East Asia	-		-	-	19.0	-
Other newly industrialized countries	4.4		-	-	9.5	15.4
A Western democracy	6.7		8.5	50.0	-	3.8
Total (percent)	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	45		47	28	21	26

Table 12. Responses to question 49: ‘Do you agree that misuse of status positions is common in the politics of your country?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kyrgyzstan	Kazakhstan
Strongly agree/agree	28.0	72.6	79.6	38.2	67.6	
Disagree/strongly disagree	70.0	25.5	16.3	58.8	32.4	
Do not know	2.0	2.0	4.1	2.9	-	
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Total (N)	50	51	49	34	37	

Table 13. Responses to question 50: ‘At which level of government do you think that the phenomenon of misuse is most common?’

Percentages responding “common” to the following levels.

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Top level	30.0	37.8	43.4	28.6	65.0	34.3
Intermediate level	38.0	55.1	60.4	57.1	43.3	48.6
Lower level officials	18.0	49.0	50.9	25.0	86.7	34.3
Parliament	4.0	32.7	54.7	7.1	73.3	34.3

Table 14. Responses to question 42: ‘To what extent do you agree with the following proposition? There are cases when powerful state and non-state actors (companies or individuals) can escape regulatory measures. Please evaluate the above statement in the case of the following actors:’
Percentages responding “strongly agree” or “agree”.

	Estonia	Latvia*	Lithuania*	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Individuals	66.0			67.6	33.3	75.0
Interest organizations	68.0			56.3	30.0	50.0
Business actors	72.0			59.4	70.0	55.2
Non-state actors*		60.0	48.1			

* Latvia and Lithuania: Only answers for one common category ‘non-state actors’. The respondents were not asked to evaluate in the case of the above mentioned actors.

Table 15. Responses to question 53: ‘In your opinion, what are the main cause(s) of corruption in the state administration? (please rank these options, if possible.)’*
Percentage observations.

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Too low salaries	21.8	37.0	17.3	42.5	35.2	53.2
Low moral quality of civil servants	45.9	26.2	40.2	30.9	21.3	27.9
Legacy of the soviet system	17.6	14.1	18.1	17.4	27.9	3.1
Illegal organization (mafia)	10.8	8.5	12.3	1.0	14.9	6.2
Other	3.9	14.1	12.1	8.2	0.6	9.6
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

* Index: Weighted average: ranked most important counted as 1, second as ½, third as 1/3.

Table 16. Responses to question 52: ‘In your opinion, are current laws sufficient for combating corruption?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Yes	76.8		26.1	28.1	58.6	11.4
No	23.3		73.9	68.8	41.4	80.0
Do not know	-		-	3.1	-	8.6
Total (percent)	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	43		46	32	29	35

Note: Recoding of open question.

Table 17 . Responses to question 23: ‘In general, in cases when foreign actors did have influence, would you say that their influence on the decisions to be made had a positive effect on the solutions of domestic problems?’

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan
Always/mostly	81.4	95.6	76.9	54.1	33.3	89.4
Rarely/never	18.6	4.4	23.1	45.9	66.7	10.7
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	43	45	52	24	27	28