

**The administration-society interface.**  
**A comparative perspective on post-communist experiences**

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This paper is based on research carried out by the DEMSTAR Program (Democracy, the State, and Administrative Reforms) financed by the Danish Social Sciences Research Council. ([www.demstar.dk](http://www.demstar.dk))

Paper prepared for the 11<sup>th</sup> NISPACee Annual Conference 'Enhancing the capacity to govern. Challenges facing the CEE Countries. Bucharest, Romania, April 10-12 2003.



How should state administrations relate to societal institutions in democratic societies undergoing rapid institutional change? Should they remain insulated in the expectation and hope that expert and benevolent politicians and bureaucrats, unconstrained by societal forces and short time concerns, will steer development in directions benefiting the whole of society? Or should state administrations maintain close liaisons with organizations in society so that the popular principal may keep a close watch on the behaviour of their agents, ultimately to improve policies and maintain the legitimacy of state institutions? This has been the core issue of democratic governance for the last decades in developing and newly industrialized countries, and – most recently – in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. Positions have been distinctly in contrast, reflecting partly unspoken constitutive theories about relations between institutions and actors and modes of policy making, partly normative theories about the content and purpose of democratic participation and engagement. The discussion has taken place in separate discourses, in particular related to democratization, to political economy, to macro-theories about state-society relations and to comparative public administration. Unfortunately, the discussions within these sub-disciplines rarely refer to each other and the cross-fertilization that may have been does not exist.

Starting from these observations, the purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between state administrations and society in a number of post-communist countries from a theoretical, empirical and normative perspective. Theoretically our discussion will depart from insights drawn from the statist tradition in political science (emphasizing the society versus state nexus) and from public administration (emphasizing the politics versus administration nexus), with relevant references to the other sub-fields. Empirically the paper explores the insights obtained from a survey of centrally placed civil servants and politically appointed ministers and department heads in 11 post-communist countries, focusing in particular on the mode (how?), the scope (how much?) and character (what kind?) of societal participation in policy making and implementation. Part one discusses competing theoretical positions. Part two examines the ‘how?’, ‘how much’ and ‘character of’ questions on the basis of a survey of core executives in 11 countries. Part three explores causal models that may explain the observed variance between the countries, while part four sets out the preliminary conclusions about how to organize administration-society relationship in countries undergoing rapid international change.

## **1. The administration-society nexus – and its relevance for the post-communist world**

Public administration in general and comparative public administration in particular traditionally focused on the interaction between the politicians and administrators. Born out of the Weberian ideal type of state administration, there was little room for direct interactions between administrators and organizations and institutions in civil society. Replicating the Schumpeterian version of democracy, the electorate should

select their representatives, who in turn would implement the popular will through the loyal administration (Schumpeter, 1994; Weber, 1992).

However, as the study of public administration gradually moved away from ideal types to behavioural and institutional approaches, and in particular began to look to non-western countries, it became clear that the ideal type bore little resemblance to reality. In particular those studying 3rd world (Riggs, Heady) and NIC countries (Moon and Ingraham, 1998; Subramaniam, 2000: 563; Jrisat, 2002; Welsh and Wong, 1998) and more recently post-communist countries (Agh, 2001; Verheien, 2000; Toonen, 1993), have recently narrowed the gap between public administration and comparative politics in the realization that the effectiveness of public administrations in developing and post-communist countries not only had to do with politician-administrator relationships. Equally important was mode, scope and character of relations between agencies of the state and organizations and institutions in society, in particular major economic actors.

The new perspectives on the administration-society nexus have in turn produced three sets of blueprints about 'good governance' as 'the process through which societies take and implement decisions on the allocation of public resources to address societal needs' done 'timely and with and with a minimum use of available resources' (UNDP, 2000: 1). A first position is taken by the 'insulationists' who claim that it is necessary to insulate decision-makers (and administrators) in secluded and autonomous state administrations to shield them against societal and economic groupings, that, in the perusal of the narrow interests, will draw policy making away from what is considered the 'social needs' (Geddes 1994, Williamson 1994). The assumption is, as summarized by Stark and Bruzst (1998: 95) that 'the greater the concentration of authority, the more the executive is able to engineer change.' The arguments around this thesis may ultimately lead to a support for a benevolent dictator as a necessary transient evil in the service of the long term good (Haggard, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman 1995). It may also concentrate on the strength of the executive, in particular about the advantages of a strong presidency vis-à-vis a parliamentary system (Linz, 1990; Linz and Valenzuela, 1990) it may argue for insulation in certain sensible policy areas, for example in short term economic policies, or it may argue for the insulation of particular segments within the executive, for example in the form of 'change teams' (Williamson, 1994; Haggard, Kaufmann, 1992; Balzerowitz, 1995; Geddes, 1994).

A second perspective is represented by the 'interdependentists', claiming that popular participation and governance is a necessary precondition to prevent the politicians and administrators from serving their own needs over those of society. Also on this side of the divide the attitudes to the scope and extent of participation have differed. The minimalist version is the Schumpeterian version of democracy, matching the weberian bureaucracy in its insistence that popular participation in governance is limited to election, leaving governance as such to the executive. Evans (1995, 1997) and Weiss (1998) occupy a middle position with their concepts

of 'embedded autonomy' (Evans) and 'governed interdependence' (Weiss and Hobson, 1995), while Stark and Bruzst (1998: 101) take this thesis further when they insist on 'extended accountability', a process that extends network ties 'beyond industrial elites and extend accountability beyond intrastate institutions to include a broader range of interests and intelligence in decision-making centres.

A third perspective of historical institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1989, 1992; North, 1990, Pierson, 1994) has bridged the two perspectives by arguing that public administrations are historical products of the societies in which they exist and that administrative reforms also should take account of national specific circumstances, which they, in the parlance of this tradition, should 'fit'. In this insistence on the importance of history and context, this tradition explicitly opposes the paradigmatic assumptions of rational institutionalism, framing a major part of the New Public Management tradition with its insistence of universal applicability (Shield, Evans, 1998). Some historical institutionalist literature also uses the calculus approach (Immergut, 1992; Hattam, 1993). In the empirical tradition, Page and Wright (1999: 268), for example broadly summarize the historical perspective and the thrust of historical institutionalism:

'Each country has a unique set of experiences of state and nation building, as well as of the role that bureaucracies occupied within these processes, and consequently bureaucratic forms and structures tend to reflect unique national experiences – experiences of dictatorship, revolution, and empire have all left their imprint on many of the bureaucracies of eastern Europe'.

In a less lyric mode Dmitrov and Goetz (2000) support a similar paradigm when they claim that to understand the structure of national executives one should construct causal models taking into account macro institutional properties and 'legacies, actor constellations, external pressures and expectations'.

In this tradition, and in the connected debate over 'policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Riggs, 2002) it has also been a critical argument that the reforms should somehow 'fit' the national conditions (Risse, Cowles & Carpaso, 2001), or demonstrate 'institutional congruence' or 'closeness of fit' (Hix & Goetz, 2000). Administrative reforms thus falter primarily for lack of political support and incongruities with political regime values. What institutional 'fit' means has, however, been less clear and depends very much on how one conceptualizes the national context and on micro level assumptions about determinants of actors' behaviour. Are they, as stipulated in new rational institutionalisms, a set of formal or informal institutions that prescribe the actions of rational actors and where a change of institutions will instigate a rational response by the actors? (Knill, 1999; Immergut, 1992). In this understanding the context and legacy may be important because of the interests that are attached to the existing institutions may halt reforms – not because rational adaptation to the new rules of the game as such is questioned. Or do national preconditions instead represent a set of norms, for example captured in March's and Olson's 'logic of appropriateness', suggesting that it is informal

norms and values more than formal institutions that matter. In this understanding a change of formal institutions is not sufficient to alter behaviour, because actor preferences endure. This understanding adds a substantive issue to administrative reforms, because new institutions need not only attain procedural legitimacy while being constrained by political values (Jrisat, 2002: 36). Also the values that are embedded in the institutions, the bureaucracy's attitudes to citizens (Toonen, 1993) and internalized by the actors, and arguably also the output of administrative actions, will ultimately decide the feasibility and viability of an institution or policy in a given context. This logic of appropriateness is reflected in the new sociological institutionalist literature. While historical institutionalists regard ideas as procedures and norms of formal institutions, sociological institutionalists regard them as templates themselves, conflating the notions of institution and culture, and defining institutions as 'the symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates that provide the 'frames of meaning' guiding human action' (Hall and Taylor 1996: 947).

These alternative interpretations about what decides success or failure of administrative reforms have also been reflected in two understandings of the communist mode of government and the subsequent implications for post-communist administrative reforms.<sup>1</sup> In one version, the traditional totalitarian emphasis is put on the general legacies of the centralized decision-making system on political loyalty and on the strict ideological control exercised over personnel and decisions (Sootla and Roots, 1999; Randma, 2001). Public administration remained what has been termed 'a policy implementation machine' (UNDP, 2001: 2). This understanding represents a variant of rational choice institutionalism, where actors in different countries are seen to have adapted rationally to the uniform institutions of the totalitarian regimes. In this version we expect executives to hang on to their traditional habits of one-way communication, commands and controls in the relationship to organizations in society (Gozman & Etkind, 1992), and only change behavior to the extent that new institutions with new incentives are put in place. The totalitarian version does therefore not predict national (or regional) differences to play a role for the present state-society interface.<sup>2</sup> This applies both to the overall scope, mode and character of the state-society interface as well as to the functional division between ministries and (presidential) departments and the consequences of this division for relations with external actors. In this version administrative reforms

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<sup>1</sup> These differences reaches back to the major controversies in classical 'Sovietology' between those perceiving communism as a petrified hierarchal and centrally controlled system – and the 'revisionist' school, focusing instead on the segmentation and conflict between major economic and regional interests, and ultimately the ungovernability of the system (Hough and Fainsod, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> This is similar to the assumptions made by neo-liberal reformist. However, while they base their policies on the expectation that rational utility maximizing actors will adapt to new institutions whatever the history of the individual country, the totalitarian perspective assumes a constituent similarity between all communist countries and hence no difference in the legacies.

falter because the incentives are wrong – not because of the absence of any fit with local circumstances.

Another (revisionist) interpretation of the communist mode of government has perceived the administrators as brokers between competing economic and regional interests. The scope, mode and character of this brokerage have depended on specific national characteristics and on the type of administration, reflecting a historical institutionalist version of the importance of previous practices for present reforms. In this version previous patterns of state-society relations will be of major importance for how relations develop under the present circumstances. State executives would here easily come out of communism as captives of major industrial and regional (or even ethnic) interests, thus embodying the predictions of historical institutionalism (Gorniak and Jerschina 1995; Stark and Bruszt 1998). In this version there exist differences between countries and regions pertaining to levels of control, to mode, scope and character of state-society relationship and to particular administrative configurations. These variations reflect in turn different historical experiences and trajectories, in particular economic, social and ethnic structures, pre-transitions liberalization, international position and reform strategies affecting the pace and content of administrative reforms. In this version the viability and feasibility of administrative reforms depends on political support and congruence with regime values. This assumption implies that there is no blueprint for how administrative reforms in general and administration-society relations in particular should be structured. All we can say is that they should somehow ‘fit’ local values and be able to attain political support.

The described theoretical distinction also applies to what we may hypothesize about how administrations’ or departments’ (in presidential systems) operational tasks will affect the level of autonomy vis-à-vis external actors. In the totalitarian version we will not expect sectoral differences to have any significant impact on administration-society relations, while this will be of major importance in the alternative, historical institutionalist inspired approach. Expanding a classical distinction (Grønnegaard, 1984: 314), we may here expect that interaction with interests in society will fall into three categories:

1. Ministries with sectoral regulatory functions (branch ministries or departments)<sup>3</sup> (type 1 administrations) or with production functions (type 2 administrations)<sup>4</sup> are more exposed to positive or negative interactions with organizations than are
2. Ministries with general regulatory tasks (type 3 administrations)<sup>5</sup> or ministries with regulating or coordinating tasks inside government (type 4 administrations)<sup>6</sup>;

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<sup>3</sup> For example ministries or departments of agriculture, trade, industry, trade etc.

<sup>4</sup> This applies to both services and goods, for example ministries or departments of welfare, health, education etc.

<sup>5</sup> For example ministries or departments of justice, environment, tax etc.

3. Presidential administrations, in these countries the institutional leftovers of the central committees of the Communist parties (type 5 administrations). In general we would expect these to be general coordinating institutions with limited external connections. However, their actual position and function is known to vary significantly.

Below we test the alternative hypotheses derived from the competing theories about what forms administrative-society relations in post-communist regimes:

H<sub>0</sub>: There are no differences between the scope, mode and character of administration–society relations between countries and functional categories of administrations: to the extent that differences exist they will exclusively reflect different reform initiatives (the Weberian version).

H<sub>1</sub>: There are differences between the scope, mode and character of administration–society relations, reflecting different historical, political and social preconditions interacting with reform initiatives (the historico-institutional version)

In the following section we examine the alternative hypotheses on country differences and differences between functionally different administrations. In section 3 we proceed to speculate (briefly) about the lessons to be drawn from the observed differences and in the conclusions for the design of administrative reforms.

## **2. Modes, scope and character of the administration-society nexus in 11 countries**

The data presented below is the outcome of surveys conducted in 11 different post-communist countries: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Georgia, Azerbajdzjan and Armenia. In all cases the ambition has been to reach a subset of executive officials of high standing placed as high as possible in the administrative hierarchies in core agencies. In the present context we use the executives as informants about real processes and institutions.<sup>7</sup> The surveys were conducted on the basis of a standardized questionnaire supplemented by a number of open questions subsequently reported to us by the interviewers and eventually to be followed up by a limited number of in-depth interviews.<sup>8</sup>

The use of responses from the surveys is based on three assumptions:<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For example the foreign ministry, prime minister's office, ministry of finance etc.

<sup>7</sup> The surveys also include attitudinal questions, dealt with in other articles.

<sup>8</sup> We recognize, following Aberbach and Rockman (1987: 483), that this rough functional comparability 'could mean that we are comparing a different breed of officials altogether. However, as we use the responses as information about processes and institutions and not values and attitudes, this reservation is not valid in the present context.

<sup>9</sup> Owing to the small (and varied numbers of) N and the level of measurement there are limitations as to what kinds of statistical analyses can be made. For technical reasons we have not yet performed the adequate statistical tests (chi-square tests. However, preliminary

1. By choosing high ranking officials (department heads) in core administrations we assume that they are in a relatively more privileged position to understand structures, processes and power in government. Nevertheless we are of course mindful of the pitfalls associated with the ‘reputational method’.<sup>10</sup>
2. We assume that our respondents are telling the truth (about how ‘things really are’) or that there is a systematic deviation from the truth among all sectors and countries.<sup>11</sup>
3. We also assume that the subset of respondents (or the answers they are providing) represents a critical case subset (and not a sample) for the answers we would obtain if we asked the total population of government officials.

Below we explore the administration-society nexus on the three dimensions described – *scope* (the scale of contacts between administrations and organizations in society; *mode* (the way in which society interacts with the administration) and *character* (the social and political content of this interaction). For these three dimensions we explore 1) regional and (when important) national differences and 2) differences between the two major types of administrations.

On the *scope* of the administration-society interface, external advisors are involved in policy-making to differing degrees in different regions and categories of administrations. In a regional perspective they are especially important in Central Europe and the Baltic states – and to a smaller degree in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, probably reflecting a general developmental or democracy factor. It is the existence of local knowledge in combination with an open and transparent political system that allows the input of experts. This is also shown by the intra-regional differences, where the inclusion for example is significantly higher in Georgia than in Armenia and Azerbaijan and higher in Kyrgyzstan than in Kazakhstan. Also the type of ministry or department affects the role of external experts, which is larger in type 1 and 3 ministries (with regulatory functions) than in type 2 and 5 (intra governmental coordinating) ministries and presidential administrations.

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tests indicate that all the tables included below have a significance below or close to 0.000 (Asymp. 2-sided).

<sup>10</sup> As summarized by Putnam (1976), such weaknesses may arise if the informants have no access to inside information, or if the knowledge is limited to a particular sphere of public affairs, because they may then ‘innocently purvey a distorted picture of power relations. Moreover, informants are often more confused than social scientists about what power is and who has it. More cautious reputational analysts ask their informants only about influence relations they have personally witnessed, but the reconstruction of overall patterns of power from a myriad of such individual reports remains a terrifically complex task’ (pp. 16-17).

<sup>11</sup> We further assume that if they provide honest answers (compared to other sources of information) in relation to sensitive questions (for example corruption), they will also be honest in relation to less sensitive issues. Based on these criteria our responses seem, with one exception (Azerbaijan), reliable.

Tables 1 + 2 about here)

Looking into the kind of experts that are involved, academics are most important in all regions and types of administrations, although there may be a slight democracy factor, with academic advisers playing a larger role in more democratic systems. Political advisors, parties and NGOs are given importance especially in the most developed democracies (the Baltic and C&EE), although Poland stands out as an interesting example where the role of external advisors other than academic specialists is significantly lower than in comparable countries. NGOs seem to play a larger role in more developed democracies (e.g. Georgia and Kyrgyzstan) than in adjacent countries. In Central Asia and in the Caucasus a particular importance is placed on the role of advisors attached to international organizations. Concerning type of administration, the patterns show what we may expect: political advisors are most important in type 3 and 4 ministries, and academics and NGOs in type 1 and 3 ministries. In presidential administrations the overall use of external advice is generally smaller, in particular regarding academic experts, while inside expertise (political advisors) is used more frequently and NGOs less frequently.

Tables 3 and 4 about here

When asked about the reasons for inclusion of external experts the need for additional information, knowledge and unbiased expertise was emphasized in all countries.

The interaction between administrations and interests in society presents a more mixed picture. First, almost all countries have a very high interaction rate with organized institutions, although the average rate is highest in Central Europe and Central Asia is higher than in The Baltic and Caucasus. These differences, however, cover large intra-regional differences, with Estonia, Latvia, and Georgia representing the most insulated states and Lithuania, Hungary and Armenia the countries where the state seems most embedded in societal organizations. The interaction differentiated by type of ministries shows the expected picture with types 1 and 2 ministries being closer to organizations than types 3 and 4. Also here the presidential administrations are close to the type four administrations.

Tables 5 + 6

Also the reasons given for this close interaction reveals a picture similar to what we may hear from Western officials: functional need for additional information and perspectives and better prospects for implementation if concerned interests are involved in the policy stage; political need to 'appease social unrests' (Polish respondent) and communicate policies to the public.

On the *mode* of state-society interaction especially Hungary, Kyrgyzstan and to a lesser extent Mongolia represent institutionalized systems, while in particular Estonia and Armenia depend on informal fora. Institutionalized interaction is most prevalent in ministries with sectoral regulatory functions. For the presidential administrations the picture is more complex. In the more liberal systems (Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Georgia) 56, 82 and 46 per cent of respondents in presidential administrations claim that they have institutional fora for interaction with organization, while none had this form of interaction in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

#### Tables 7 and 8

Finally, on the *character* of the interface, we of course have to cope with huge reliability problems, and the observations reported will be as much a function of the degree of freedom of expression and political cultures in the countries involved as they may represent a picture of reality. In Tables 9-10 we report the perceived penetration of the state administration by outside forces. As seen from the tables this picture reflects what Peters (2002) would term 'functional villages' in most countries, except Mongolia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have the appearance more of insulated and less corrupted/penetrated states. This picture is, probably, incorrect, reflecting more a distinction between what is perceived as legitimate and illegitimate interference and connections between the state administration and more or less respectable organizations. Also, when we differentiate by type of administration, it is significant that the interference is perceived as much higher by officials in the internal coordinating units (where interference would make little sense) than in the sectoral regulating and production oriented ministries, where such interference typically would take place. The nature of the country subset included in the presidential administrations (type 5 administrations) explains the low score on this variable, although the scores in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia are on the same level as in the type 3 and 4 administrations (see table).

#### Tables 9-10

This association between reliability and democracy becomes even clearer in tables 11-12, about the perceived level of corruption in the administration. The most surprising part of these responses is probably the readiness to admit misuse of position in so many countries in front of an interviewer. If we assume that the propensity to avoid the truth is similar across sectors, it is also here telling that the highest level of admission of misuse is found in the coordinating agencies. The apparently more negative answers in the presidential administrations are also here explained by the subset of countries included in this group (see table 11).

## Tables 11-12

Finally on the level at which misuse is perceived as most common, in particular Kazakhstan and to a lesser extent Georgia stand out as countries with misuse at high (political) levels, while corruption thrives at lower administrative levels in most other countries. Also misuse in parliament is conceived as rather widespread except in democratic Hungary and Estonia and, surprisingly, in Armenia. Also, functional administrations seem most focused on the level of administrations they are dealing with: type 3 and four administrations pay especial attention to high level (and political) misuse, while type 1 and 2 administrations focus more on lower level administrative misuse. The presidential anomaly also here is explained by the country subset.

## Tables 13-14

### **3. Exploring causal models**

The previous section demonstrated that there are significant differences in the scope, mode and character of the interaction between the states' administrations and societies in the 11 post-communist countries we deal with in this paper. While there certainly can be expected to be effects from differences in scope and character of administrative reforms since the beginning of the transformation (reforms which we have not dealt with in this paper), the existing patterns make it unlikely to assume that all differences stem from recent reforms. Instead it seems plausible to assume that a major part of the variation is linked to differences in national and international contexts. Hence, at a general level we find support for  $H_0$  – that actors and institutions are colored by experience and context, and not only adapt to existing institutions. Following this conclusion, the next question is how we then in more concrete terms explain this variance. Below we list a number of causal factors that deserve further study:

1. The scope of interaction, the contact to society that is channeled through the use of experts in the policy making process (scope and type of expertise), is very dependent on level of democracy and developmental factors. The developmental factor counts for the availability of functional expertise, while level of democracy determines the openness of the administration to include external advice.
2. Administrations' interaction with interests in society is in general very high, and supports the perception of communist administrations more as interlocker between the political and societal level and between alternating interests more than the 'implementation machine' pictured by the totalitarian/Weberian model. While the embeddedness in society thus represents a continuance from the communist period, it may also in some cases be the result of specific policy choices. This is for example the case in countries as Estonia and

Poland, where the linkages to major corporate interests were cut off as part of the neo-liberal reforms strategy, emphasizing top down policies by an isolated change team. In the case of Estonia this choice in turn has a structural-ethnic background in the desire to deprive the Russian dominated industrial elite political influence.

3. On the mode of interaction, the level of institutionalization probably reflects long-lasting policy styles in the individual countries, but also political preferences where the establishment or elimination of veto points in the political structure will reflect power and influence of competing interests. Hungary and Lithuania are here prominent examples of the first kind of institutionalization, Poland an example of the opposite trend, where the abolishment of corporatist institutions is an apparent example of an institutional choice with political ramifications.
4. On the character of state-society links we enter the complex discussion on the origin of corruption. It is understandable that countries that by choice have limited the interaction with society (like Estonia) are able to prevent extensive corruption. But why is it that in some of the countries the close interaction between state and society is accompanied by an extensive ‘misuse of position’, while others escape corruption? The pattern of responses in this paper does not provide any clear evidence and will be dealt with in separate papers.<sup>12</sup>

#### **4. Conclusions: Implications for the administration-society interface**

The present paper has addressed the somehow overlooked state-society interface as part of the administrative reforms in post-communist countries. The first part of the paper presented competing positive and normative theories about the administration-society interface. On the first count we described two alternative normative theories (based on specific historical experiences) about how the interface should be arranged to provide development and progress. On the second we used data from a cross-country survey of centrally placed executives to pattern the administration-society relationship in 11 post-communist countries, and in turn examine the validity of the competing theoretical position. Our data, showing huge variations between countries and sectors, supported the perspective that emphasizes the role of context and historical experiences in contrast to more rationalist and actor oriented explanations stressing the homogeneity of the incumbent communist systems and their legacies.

What (preliminary) normative conclusions may we draw from these observations about which scope, mode and character of administration-society interfaces is most conducive to economic and political development? The only clear conclusion is that there is no clear solution or blueprint that is applicable to all countries. Context and history matter for the sort of institutional arrangements that

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<sup>12</sup> The survey questionnaire does address this issue, but the answers are of course far from conclusive but refer to a host of structural, economic and psychological factors.

are viable and feasible in individual countries and the solutions that we may come up with will depend on the circumstances. On the scope of interaction we have countries with an insulated state (Estonia, Kazakhstan Poland) that for different reasons have been quite successful. But there are also examples where an intense interface has been accompanied by economic and political decay (Kyrgyzstan, Georgia). On the mode of interaction Hungary is a successful example of a country where a traditional consensual and corporatist system has provided positive results. Lithuania is a (relatively mild) example of the opposite. And finally on corruption it is possibly true that corruption is detrimental to development and growth. Still a country like Kazakhstan is characterized both by high corruption and stability and growth. In contrast, its neighbour Kyrgyzstan is haunted by an equally high corruption but as one among several factors contributing to economic and political decay. The unpleasant conclusion is probably, here repeating Root's (1996) observation, that political corruption (in contrast to administrative) actually may be positive in a short time perspective, because it may mean a mobilization of resources and a stability that otherwise would not be there.

Still, the major observation from this paper is that so far there are not general answers to how the administration–society interface should be arranged if the ambition is to provide democracy and development.

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## Tables

*Table .1 Responses to question 4a: “To what extent are external advisors used in the policymaking proces? (The question refers to the ministry in general).”*

	Estonia	Lithuania	Latvia	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Always	4.0	10.0	N/A	18.8	3.4	11.8	1.9	28.6	6	1	3
Often	50.0	42.0		43.8	20.7	14.7	26.2	45.7	40	13	18
Sometimes, concerning important issues	40.0	38.0		25.0	75.9	64.7	64.1	17.1	42	62	51
Rarely	6.0	10.0		12.5	-	8.8	7.8	8.6	12	24	24
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total N	50	50		32	29	34	103	35	100	100	100

Note: 12 missing cases distributed evenly among the countries.

*Table 2. Responses to question 4a: “To what extent are external advisors used in the policymaking proces? (The question refers to the ministry in general).”*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra-government coordination functions (Type 4).	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Always	7.7	4.2	8.9	7.3	4.2
Often	42.3	28.7	28.7	29.1	23.2
Sometimes, concerning important issues	43.3	58.7	48.5	50.9	46.3
Rarely	6.7	8.4	13.9	12.7	26.2
Total (Percent)	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	104	143	101	110	164

Note: 59 missing cases, of which the type of ministry *Regulating or Coordinating tasks* has 31 missing.

*Table 3. Responses to question 4: 'If you needed external advice, whom would you prefer to rely on, or have you relied on to get the information you need?' Percentage observations. (Multiple answer).*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Political Advisors	26.0	38.0	28.3	24.2	23.3	30,6	7,8	13.9	33	23	24
Political Parties	44.0	24.0	7.5	50.0	-	11,1	1	2.8	17	3	10
Academic Specialists	72.0	72.0	86.8	79.4	60.0	44,4	81,5	75.0	84	59	55
NGO specialists	44.0	40.0	49.1	48.5	10.0	36,1	30,1	33.3	52	31	16

*Table 4. Responses to question 4: 'If you needed external advice, whom would you prefer to rely on, or have you relied on to get the information you need?' Percentage observations. (Multiple answer).*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra-government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Political Advisors	14.3	19.9	25.0	25.0	32.1
Political Parties	12.4	12.6	13.0	15.7	11.5
Academic Specialists	83.2	74.2	77.8	68.6	57.6
NGO specialists	44.6	35.8	36.1	34.3	26.7

*Table 5. Responses to question 26: 'Do civil servants in your ministry have close working relationships with major interest organizations within the ministry's resort?'*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Yes, most of the time	24.0	25.0	53.7	67.6	36.7	58.3	67,6	55,6	36	60	42
Yes, on important issues	56.0	39.6	41.5	29.4	50.0	30.6	29,4	27,8	49	34	52
No	20.0	35.4	4.9	2.9	13.3	11.1	2,9	16,7	15	6	5
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100,0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	48	41	34	30	36	102	36	100	100	100

Note: 19 missing cases, of which Lithuania has 12 missing.

*Table 6. Responses to question 26: ‘Do civil servants in your ministry have close working relationships with major interest organizations within the ministry’s resort?’*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra-government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Yes, most of the time	53.6	51.7	48.1	43.0	45.7
Yes, on important issues	38.2	42.2	38.7	43.0	42.7
No	8.2	6.1	13.2	14.1	11.6
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	110	147	106	135	164

Note: 19 missing cases distributed evenly among the ministries.

*Table 7. Responses to question 28a: ‘In which form is/was the concerned interests incorporated or consulted in the process of formulation?’*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Institutional forum for discussion and cooperation	26.0			89.3	30.0	68.8	53.4	6.7	42.7	13.2	13.6
Institutional forums on ad hoc basis	30.0			7.1	66.7	9.4	32	40.0	12.5	19.8	8.6
Informal forums depending on character of the case	44.0			3.6	3.3	21.9	14.6	53.3	44.8	67	77.8
Total (percent)	100.0			100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50			28	30	32	103	15	96	91	81

Note: 45 missing cases, of which Azerbaijan has 19 missing.

*Table 8. Responses to question 28a: 'In which form is/was the concerned interests incorporated or consulted in the process of formulation?'*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra-government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Institutional forum for discussion and cooperation	50.0	33.1	34.5	30.3	31
Institutional forums on ad hoc basis	37.8	33.1	21.4	25.0	6.3
Informal forums depending on character of the case	12.2	33.9	44.0	44.7	62.7
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	74	124	84	76	158

Note: 165 missing cases, of which the type of ministry/department *Regulating or Coordinating tasks* has 65 missing.

*Table 9. Responses to question 21: From your point of view, when other ministries, departments or political circles interfered in your business, could it be that a third party outside the realm of politics has interfered in the decision-making?*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Agree	58.0	80.0	69.6	66.7	66.7	41.2	9	38.2	43	12	1
Disagree	22.0	18.0	17.4	30.3	3.3	26.5	40	50.0	37	46	76
Do not know	20.0	2.0	13.0	3.0	30.0	32.3	51	11.8	20	42	23
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50.0	50.0	46.0	33.0	30.0	34	100	34.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Note: 19 missing cases distributed evenly among the countries.

*Table 10. Responses to question 21: From your point of view, when other ministries, departments or political circles interfered in your business, could it be that a third party outside the realm of politics has interfered in the decision-making?*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra-government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Agree	43.2	38.9	34.9	42.8	45.7
Disagree	33.3	33.3	37.7	34.1	42.7
Do not know	23.4	27.8	27.4	23.2	11.6
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	111	144	106	138	164

Note: 19 missing cases distributed evenly among the ministries.

*Table 11. Responses to question 49: ‘Do you agree that misuse of status positions is common in the politics of your country?’*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hun	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Strongly agree/ agree	28.0	72.6	79.4	38.2	n/a	67.7	41,7	17.2	65	33	6
Disagree/strongly disagree	70.0	25.5	16.3	58.8		32.4	57,3	70.0	31	48	85
Do not know	2.0	2.0	4.1	2.9			1	2.9	4	19	10
Total (percent)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (N)	50	51	49	34		37	103	35	100	100	100

Note: 6 missing cases distributed evenly among the countries.

*Table 12. Responses to question 49: ‘Do you agree that misuse of status positions is common in the politics of your country?’*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Strongly agree/ agree	42.3	46.5	38.8	48.8	36.7
Disagree/strongly disagree	53.8	47.8	56.3	29.3	55.4
Do not know	3.8	5.7	14.6	6.9	7.8
Total (percent)	100	100	100	100	100
Total (N)	104	140	103	131	166

Note: 37 missing cases distributed evenly among the ministries.

*Table 13. Responses to question 50: ‘At which level of government do you think that the phenomenon of misuse is most common?’ Percentages responding “common” to the following levels.*

	Estonia	Latvia	Lithuania	Hungary	Kazakhstan	Kyrgyzstan	Mongolia	Poland	Georgia	Armenia	Azerbaijan
Top level	30.0	37.8	43.4	28.6	65.0	66.7	18.4	15.7	56	19	8
Intermediate level	38.0	55.1	60.4	57.1	56.7	47.2	61.2	31.4	59	30	36
Lower level officials	18.0	49.0	50.9	25.0	13.3	44.2	28	31.4	36	16	32
Parliament	4.0	32.7	54.7	7.1	26.7	34.3	24.3	28.6	51	6	–

*Table 14. Responses to question 50: ‘At which level of government do you think that the phenomenon of misuse is most common?’ Percentages responding “common” to the following levels.*

	Sectoral regulatory functions (Type 1)	Production functions (Type 2)	General regulatory functions (Type 3)	Intra government coordination functions (Type 4)	Presidential administration (Type 5)
Top level	26.6	21.8	22.7	33.7	16.5
Intermediate level	51.0	47.5	47.0	55.7	48.2
Lower level officials	36.3	23.8	28.7	38.5	31.1
Parliament	25.5	24.5	22.2	29.8	22